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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
         In Trustees of the Univ. of Pennsylvania v. Lexington 
Ins. Co., 815 F.2d 890 (3d Cir. 1987), we predicted Pennsylvania 
law would allow a two-tiered or conditional settlement between a 
plaintiff and an insured when the insurer refused to defend 
against plaintiff's suit.  In this case we predict Pennsylvania 
law would also permit a two-tiered settlement between a 
plaintiff, an insured and the insured's excess insurer, when the 
primary insurer refused to settle plaintiff's claim.  
                               I. 
                                A. 
         In January 1987, Sandra McIlhenny slipped and bruised 
herself on the steps of the Crown Park Apartments in Lansdale, 
Pennsylvania.  Three months later she was diagnosed with multiple 
sclerosis.  Shortly thereafter, McIlhenny brought suit in the Court 
of Common Pleas for Philadelphia County against the owner and 
manager of the building, Rodin Management, Inc., alleging the fall 
had precipitated or aggravated a previously dormant condition. 
         Rodin purchased primary liability insurance from the 
Greater New York Mutual Insurance Company with a one million dollar 
limit per occurrence.  Rodin also purchased excess general 
liability insurance from the North River Insurance Company, with 
coverage from one million to ten million dollars. 
         Greater New York retained counsel to defend Rodin in 
McIlhenny's personal injury action, as it was obligated to do under 
its policy.  McIlhenny initially made a demand of $770,000, but 
later increased the amount to $1 million.  Defense counsel 
recommended settlement between $500,000 and $750,000, but Greater 
New York made no offer.  The case went to trial and after the jury 
began deliberating, Greater New York offered $350,000.  Plaintiff's 
counsel considered this amount to be a non-offer because "no 
reasonable person who had sat in that courtroom could make this 
offer."  The jury awarded McIlhenny $4 million.  The trial judge 
molded the verdict resulting in a total award of $5,796,000.  
Greater New York appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. 
         The appeal was withdrawn, however, because North River on 
behalf of itself and Rodin, negotiated a settlement directly with 
McIlhenny for $5.25 million.  Under the settlement agreement, 
North River paid McIlhenny $l,949,629 and provided her with a 
lifetime annuity.  In return, McIlhenny released North River and 
Rodin from all further liability.  Because the $5.25 million 
settlement was greater than the amount McIlhenny received from 
North River and Greater New York, North River agreed to "exercise 
its best efforts to recover the full settlement amount from Greater 
New York through litigation or other proceedings."  If North River 
prevailed, it would retain the first million and 60% of the 
overage; McIlhenny would receive the remaining 40%.  To fund the 
litigation, McIlhenny channeled North River $400,000 of the one 
million she received from Greater New York.   
                                B. 
         Before North River could bring an action against Greater 
New York, as it had agreed to do, Greater New York brought this 
suit in federal district court, alleging the settlement was invalid 
as a matter of law, and that North River and Rodin breached its 
duty of good faith.  Greater New York also sought the return of the 
one million dollars it had paid McIlhenny.  
         North River then filed suit in the Court of Common Pleas 
for Philadelphia County against Greater New York for bad faith on 
behalf of itself and as the assignee and equitable subrogee of 
Rodin.  North River sought $4,250,000, representing the full value 
of the settlement less $1,000,000 already paid by Greater New York.  
Greater New York removed the claim to federal court, and the two 
cases were consolidated for discovery and trial. 
         In a pretrial order, the district court upheld the two- 
tiered settlement and dismissed all of Greater New York's claims 
against North River.  Greater New York Mut. Ins. Co. v. North River 
Ins. Co., 872 F. Supp. 1403 (E.D. Pa. 1995).  Holding two-tiered 
settlements are permitted under Pennsylvania law, it also 
determined an excess insurer owes no direct duty of good faith to 
a primary insurer when negotiating a settlement agreement.  Greater 
New York appeals these orders. 
         At trial, a jury found Greater New York breached its duty 
of good faith to Rodin by failing to settle McIlhenny's lawsuit in 
a timely and satisfactory manner.  The jury also found Rodin did 
not breach its duty of good faith to Greater New York by entering 
into the two-tiered settlement agreement.  It gave North River a 
verdict for $4,432,324 ($5.25 million minus one million already 
paid by Greater New York plus other costs).  Greater New York 
contends it was entitled to a directed verdict that it did not 
breach its duty of good faith.  It also appeals certain evidentiary 
rulings. 
                               II. 
                               A. 
         The district court had jurisdiction based on diversity of 
citizenship.  28 U.S.C.  1332.  We have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C.  1291.  In diversity cases we must apply the substantive 
law of the state whose law governs the action.  Erie R.R. Co. v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).  The parties agree Pennsylvania 
law governs.  Our review of the district court's interpretations 
and predictions of state law is plenary.  Salve Regina College v. 
Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231 (1991); Wiley v. State Farm Fire & 
Casualty Co., 995 F.2d 457, 459 (3d Cir. 1993).   
                                B. 
         The principal issue on appeal is whether the two-tiered 
conditional settlement assented to by McIlhenny, Rodin, and North 
River is permitted under Pennsylvania law.  Because no Pennsylvania 
case has directly addressed the enforceability of two-tiered 
settlement agreements we must predict how the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court would decide the issues before us.  U.S. Underwriters Ins. 
Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 90, 93 (3d Cir. 1996).  But 
this is not the first time we have examined a two-tiered 
settlement.  In a similar case, after an exhaustive review of 
Pennsylvania case law and a thorough analysis of the relevant 
policies, we predicted the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would enforce 
a two-tiered settlement.  Lexington, 815 F.2d 890. 
         Lexington involved a settlement by the Hospital of the 
University of Pennsylvania with a personal injury plaintiff.  Under 
the settlement's terms, HUP agreed to pay $2.2 million itself and 
an additional $4.8 million if it won a suit against its insurer, 
Lexington, which had refused coverage.  Applying Pennsylvania law, 
we upheld the validity of the two-tiered settlement, subject to the 
requirements of good faith and reasonableness.  Lexington, 815 F.2d 
at 902.  "Prohibiting two-tiered settlements," we noted, may "force 
insureds to turn down advantageous settlement offers."  Id. at 
901-02. 
         We see nothing in the facts of this case that would lead 
us to a different outcome.  Lexington's central rationale that a 
prohibition on two-tiered settlements would prevent some insureds 
from accepting advantageous settlements also applies where an 
excess insurer, an insured and a victim/plaintiff collectively 
forge a settlement.  The mere addition of an excess insurer into 
the settlement equation does not alter our sense of how the 
Pennsylvania courts would assess the legality of two-tiered 
settlements.   
         Greater New York contends Lexington is inapposite because 
it involved a bad faith failure to defend while this case involves 
a failure to settle.  Greater New York points out that in failure- 
to-settle cases the victim/plaintiff, its counsel, and the excess 
insurer have an incentive to color their testimony about settlement 
negotiations in the underlying lawsuit in order to recover as much 
as possible from the primary insurer.  In contrast, failure-to- 
defend-cases brought by an insured against an insurer revolve 
around contractual duties and typically will not require the 
testimony of the victim/plaintiff or its counsel. 
         As Lexington makes clear, there are dangers associated 
with two-tier settlements, including the prospect of self-dealing 
and self-serving testimony.  See Lexington, 815 F.2d at 902.  
Arguably this danger is heightened in excess insurer versus primary 
insurer failure-to-settle cases.  But many kinds of cases provide 
inducements to color testimony, and we routinely leave it to juries 
to assess the forthrightness and honesty of witnesses.  Witness 
credibility and the reasonableness of settlement agreements are 
questions of fact.  Nothing in Pennsylvania law indicates we should 
prohibit two-tiered settlements in order to guard against jury 
imperfection.  In this case reasonableness and good faith are 
factual issues that were squarely put to the jury.   
                              III. 
                               A. 
         The central issue at trial was whether Greater New York 
acted in bad faith in refusing to settle McIlhenny's claims.  
Greater New York maintains the evidence did not support the jury's 
finding it had failed to meet its duty.  It argues it presented an 
adequate defense and believed it would prevail at trial on 
causation.  Contending it had no affirmative obligation to make a 
settlement offer, it claims it never received a settlement offer 
within the range suggested by its counsel. 
         The district court required North River to prove by clear 
and convincing evidence that Greater New York did not honestly, 
intelligently, and objectively evaluate the McIlhenny case for jury 
verdict potential and settlement value.  See Puritan Ins. Co. v. 
Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 775 F.2d 76, 79 (3d Cir. 1985) 
(enunciating standard of proof).  Indeed, Greater New York does not 
challenge the jury instruction.  Reviewing the record, we find 
there was ample evidence to support the jury's verdict.  See Walter 
v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 985 F.2d 1232, 1238 (3d Cir. 1993) (a motion 
for judgment as a matter of law should only be granted if viewing 
all the evidence in the light most favorable to nonmovant, no jury 
could decide in favor of the nonmovant).          
         The record reveals North River presented substantial 
evidence of Greater New York's bad faith in evaluating the claim 
and in refusing to settle.  Regarding causation, Roberta D. 
Pichini, McIlhenny's counsel in the underlying litigation, 
testified defense counsel submitted a report from its medical 
expert, Dr. Alter, which agreed with plaintiff's medical expert, 
Dr. Poser, that trauma can cause dormant multiple sclerosis to 
become symptomatic.  Furthermore, defense counsel supplied no 
expert report that could contradict the findings of plaintiff's 
rehabilitation witnesses. 
         With respect to damages, early in the litigation Pichini 
supplied Greater New York's defense counsel with reports from 
medical and rehabilitation experts, projecting rehabilitation 
damages of $5,000,000.  At that time, plaintiff's settlement demand 
was $700,000 plus repayment of the Workmen's Compensation lien of 
$77,700.  Pichini testified that she would have recommended 
acceptance of a pretrial offer of $750,000.  As we have noted, 
neither defense counsel nor Greater New York made any offer of 
settlement before trial.  After the jury began deliberating, 
Greater New York offered $350,000. 
         Max Solomon, Greater New York's Executive Vice President 
for Claims, had authority to settle claims between $25,000 and 
$1,000,000.  Solomon testified that defense counsel wrote a 
pretrial report for Greater New York on July 12, 1993, four days 
before trial, offering little or no hope that Rodin could escape 
liability for McIlhenny's fall.  Defense counsel advised Greater 
New York there was a 50-50 chance the jury would believe the 
plaintiff's theory of medical causation and if so, could award a 
verdict from one to two million dollars.  As a result, defense 
counsel recommended settlement between $500,000 and $750,000.  On 
July 15, 1993, the day before trial, Solomon discussed the 
McIlhenny case with defense counsel.  Solomon admitted that he had 
not evaluated letters or reports from defense counsel.  Despite not 
having read defense counsel's pretrial report or having discussed 
the case in any detail with defense counsel, Solomon believed 
liability was questionable and the case should be tried.  As a 
result, there was no offer of settlement.     
         North River presented experts to support its claim of a 
bad faith refusal to settle.  Perry S. Bechtle, Esq., testified 
Greater New York acted in bad faith in not evaluating the case 
after Dr. Alter examined plaintiff and in failing to settle within 
Greater New York's policy limits.  Some of Greater New York's own 
witnesses also supported the jury's finding of bad faith.  For 
example, Maureen Rowan, Esq., the defense attorney in the 
underlying suit, testified she believed it "probably" would have 
been reasonable to attempt to settle between $500,000 and $750,000 
before trial.  During the course of her representation, Greater New 
York never asked her to provide an evaluation of jury verdict 
potential or settlement value (although four days before trial she 
wrote and transmitted an unsolicited report).  Greater New York's 
own insurance expert, Walter Zimmer, testified that written 
evaluations are a necessary part of claims evaluation where the 
potential exposure exceeds one million dollars.  Nonetheless, he 
admitted that no written evaluations were contained in the 
McIlhenny file.  Together this evidence was more than sufficient 
for the jury to conclude Greater New York had acted in bad faith in 
refusing to settle.  
                               B. 
         There was also substantial evidence of the reasonableness 
of the settlement.  Pamela McKinney, a claims representative for 
North River, testified that following the verdict she engaged in 
settlement discussions with McIlhenny's counsel, Pichini.  North 
River settled, she said, because it received an opinion from 
counsel that Rodin's chances to prevail on appeal were less than 
50%.  In addition, post-judgment interest was accruing at the rate 
of $l,000 a day.  The settlement agreement resulted in the complete 
release of all claims against Rodin and satisfied the judgment 
entered against Rodin.   
         Pichini testified that she believed the settlement was 
reasonable.  Despite her confidence the verdict would be upheld on 
appeal, her client was in immediate need of funds for medical care.  
North River offered expert opinion from Joseph H. Foster, Esq., who 
testified that after a thorough examination of the trial record, he 
found the trial judge committed no reversible error.  The chances 
of success on appeal, he said, were "very slim."  
         Perry Bechtle, Esq., also testified that the chances of 
success on appeal were very slim.  Because post-judgment interest 
was accruing at the rate of $l,000 a day, and because appeals to 
the Pennsylvania Superior Court and Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
would take one to one and a half and two years respectively, he 
concluded it was reasonable to settle the case for $5.25 million.  
The settlement agreement gave McIlhenny money for immediate medical 
care while providing Rodin with complete releases and satisfaction 
of the judgment. 
                               C. 
         Greater New York also contends the district court should 
have ruled as a matter of law that it did not breach its duty of 
good faith.  We do not agree.  The district court correctly 
observed that under Pennsylvania law primary insurers owe no direct 
duty of good faith to excess insurers.  Greater New York, 872 F. 
Supp. at 1409.  But it also correctly ruled North River could, as 
Rodin's subrogee, sue Greater New York for acting in bad faith.  
Id.  Therefore, we will affirm the district court's refusal to 
dismiss all counts of North River's complaint alleging a breach of 
Greater New York's duty of good faith.   
                              IV. 
         Additionally, Greater New York contends the two-tiered 
settlement here offends the principles of equitable subrogation.  
See Johnson v. Beane, 664 A.2d 96, 100 (Pa. 1995) (discussing the 
doctrine under Pennsylvania law).  As we have noted, North River 
brought this action as Rodin's subrogee. 
         Greater New York contends that under Pennsylvania law a 
subrogee can only recover the amount it has paid on behalf of the 
subrogor.  See, e.g., Johnson, 664 A.2d at 100 (subrogee stands in 
shoes of subrogor and may pursue an action to recover amounts paid 
to subrogor); Associated Hospital Service v. Pustilnik, 439 A.2d 
1149, 1151 (Pa. 1981) ("It is settled that the right of subrogation 
exists only to the extent of actual payment by the subrogee.").  
Because North River never paid, nor will it ever pay the second 
tier of the settlement agreement, Greater New York maintains North 
River cannot recover the amount "payable" under this tier.  Its 
liability, if any, therefore must be limited to the first tier. 
         But equitable subrogation is a legal construct, employed 
by courts when one person, acting involuntarily or under some 
obligation, pays the debt of another.  The rule is designed to 
facilitate the placement of the burden of debt on the party who 
should bear it.  Johnson, 664 A.2d at 100.  And whether in contract 
or equity, subrogation "is to be regarded as based upon and 
governed by equitable principles."  F.B. Washburn Candy Corp. v. 
Fireman's Fund, 541 A.2d 771, 774 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (quotingAllstate 
Ins. Co. v. Clarke, 527 A.2d 1021, 1023-24 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1987)).  An insurer, including an excess insurer, upon discharging 
an insured's liability, can become equitably subrogated and may 
assert its insured's claims against third parties, including a 
primary insurer.  Cf. Brinkley v. Pealer, 491 A.2d 894, 898 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1985) (insurer's payment to insured renders insurer 
insured's subrogee and places insured in precise position of 
insurer); see also Barry R. Ostranger & Thomas R. Newman, Handbook 
on Insurance Disputes  13.05 (1995).  
         Subrogation aims to avoid unjust enrichment.  United 
States Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. United Penn Bank, 524 A.2d 958, 
964 (Pa. Super. Ct.), appeal denied, 536 A.2d 1333 (Pa. 1987).  But 
the two-tiered settlement here will not result in North River 
obtaining any more money than it paid to McIlhenny on behalf of 
Rodin.  As the district court pointed out, the settlement only 
permits North River to reimburse itself for amounts already paid to 
McIlhenny.  Any amount in excess of the first tier will be paid to 
McIlhenny.  Greater New York, 872 F. Supp. at 1410.  North River 
has not sued Greater New York for more than it owes on behalf of 
Rodin; what it pays for Rodin will turn on its suit against Greater 
New York.  Moreover, the fact that McIlhenny accepted a second-tier 
as part of the settlement does not create a cause of action for 
North River against Greater New York, nor does it make North 
River's suit against Greater New York more likely to succeed on the 
merits. 
         What Greater New York contests is that the level of 
payment to McIlhenny may vary depending on whether North River can 
make out a successful claim against Greater New York.  As noted, 
Greater New York contends the right of subrogation exists only to 
the extent of actual payment by the subrogee.  Yet in view of our 
discussion of the purposes of subrogation, without contrary 
direction from the Pennsylvania courts, we see no reason to 
proscribe two-tiered settlements because they involve payments 
conditioned on the outcome of suits by excess insurers against 
primary insurers. 
                               V. 
         Greater New York also contends North River owed it a duty 
of good faith in negotiating the settlement, and the district court 
erred by dismissing its claim for breach of duty.  Confronted with 
an absence of definitive Pennsylvania case law, the district court 
looked to our prior holding in Puritan Ins. Co. v. Canadian 
Universal Ins. Co., 775 F.2d 76, 79 (3d Cir. 1985) (Pennsylvania 
would reject the theory of a direct duty running from primary to 
excess insurer), and to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision 
in D'Ambrosio v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins., 431 A.2d 966, 
969-70 (Pa. 1981) (there is no common law cause of action arising 
in tort for failure to act in good faith in connection with an 
insurance policy).  Because a primary insurer owes no direct duty 
of good faith to an excess insurer, the district court could "see 
no reason" why this duty would run in the opposite direction.  
Therefore, the district court held that an excess insurer owes a 
primary insurer no direct duty of good faith under Pennsylvania 
law.  Greater New York, 872 F. Supp. at 1406. 
         Nonetheless, Greater New York contends the district court 
was mistaken.  It argues "[t]his duty arises as matter of law based 
on the doctrine of subrogation, and arises as a matter of necessity 
if an excess insurer is to be allowed to negotiate two-tiered 
settlement agreements."   
         Because in Lexington we approved two-tiered settlements 
subject to the conditions of "reasonableness and good faith,"  
Greater New York contends that by negotiating a two-tiered 
settlement, North River assumed a duty of good faith.  Greater New 
York also argues that because an insured owes a duty of good faith 
to its insurer, North River, by negotiating on behalf of its 
insured and becoming its subrogee, assumed the insured's duty to 
act in good faith.   
         We are not convinced.  Lexington's requirement of "good 
faith and reasonableness" attaches to the settlement between the 
plaintiff and the insured or those standing in its place.  It does 
not create an independent set of duties running between primary and 
excess insurers.  Even if under Pennsylvania law an insured owes a 
duty of good faith to its insurer, equitable subrogation does not 
create a distinct duty of good faith between the insured's 
subrogee, here the excess insurer, and a primary insurer.   
         Although Greater New York suggests two-tiered settlements 
necessitate the imposition of a duty of good faith on an excess 
insurer, nothing in Pennsylvania law indicates that equitable 
subrogation creates a duty of excess insurer to a primary insurer, 
independent of the duties the excess insurer assumed as subrogee.  
Of course, North River, as Rodin's subrogee, in its suit against 
Greater New York became subject to the claims and defenses Greater 
New York was entitled to assert against Rodin.  See U.S. Fire Ins. 
Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., 759 F.2d 306, 309 (3d Cir. 1985) (with 
equitable subrogation "[i]t follows the excess insurer should 
assume the rights as well as the obligations of the insured in that 
position").   
         Yet the existence of Rodin's duty is undisputed.  Indeed, 
the jury in the Greater New York-North River suit found that Rodin 
had not breached its duty of good faith to Greater New York.  In 
so doing, the jury established that North River did not breach the 
only form of duty it might have had to Greater New York.   
                              VI. 
         Finally, Greater New York argues the district court erred 
by precluding the testimony of one of its central witnesses, Joseph 
McMahon, an employee with responsibility for handling McIlhenny's 
personal injury claim.  Before trial, Greater New York represented 
that McMahon was seriously ill and could not be deposed or testify 
at trial.  Then, on the Friday before trial he was deemed well 
enough to appear.  The jury had already been selected and the 
discovery deadline had long since passed.  So had the date for 
submitting pre-trial memoranda.  McMahon was not listed in pre- 
trial documents as a prospective witness.  For several months 
Greater New York had insisted that McMahon would be unable to 
testify at deposition or at trial.  North River relied on this 
representation in preparing for trial.  For these reasons, the 
court determined his appearance would be highly prejudicial to 
North River.  Balancing the equities, the court found the prejudice 
to North River from allowing McMahon to testify would be far 
greater than any potential prejudice to Greater New York.  
         Greater New York asserts this ruling "eviscerated" its 
ability to defend itself against the charge that it handled the 
McIlhenny claim in bad faith, and challenges the district court's 
ruling.  We review such judgments under an abuse of discretion 
standard.  See Sowell v. Butcher & Singer, Inc., 926 F.2d 289, 301 
(3d Cir. 1991).  In light of the district court's thoughtful 
consideration of the equities, and its sound reasons, articulated 
after a hearing, we find the court acted well within its authority.  
We see no abuse of discretion. 
                              VII. 
         Neither these alleged evidentiary errors nor the court's 
rulings on the issue of Greater New York's duty of good faith 
provide any basis for concluding the district court abused its 
discretion.  Therefore, we find Greater New York's motion for a new 
trial was appropriately denied.  See Dunn v. Hovic, 1 F.3d 1362, 
1364 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 650 (1993) (denial of 
motion for new trial is reviewed for abuse of discretion).  
                              VIII. 
         For the foregoing reasons we will affirm the judgment of 
the district court. 
 
                         
 
 
